Россия на Украине: понять умом, а не западными ценностями >> ЧИТАТЬ
U.S. President Donald Trump expressed his dissatisfaction with Russia’s unwillingness, in the near future, to agree to a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Ukraine. Moreover, the leader of the collective West gave Vladimir Putin a 50-day deadline to recognize the inevitability of peace on his own terms. Otherwise, threats were voiced, including the White House’s readiness to once again support Kyiv with military and financial resources, and additional restrictions could be imposed on Russia. Whether Trump’s words are realistic will be shown only by time, but it is already clear that the answer to the question of “why” the Kremlin initiated hostilities against Kyiv lies on the surface.
Before answering this pressing question, it is necessary to highlight several important points and arrive at some common denominators. Here are some of them — some will like them, others will not.
First, the most important fact is the war itself. Yes, between Ukraine and Russia there is not a “special military operation” (SMO), but a full-scale war. Of course, one can cite the example of the United States, which, since the end of World War II, has not officially declared war on any country, yet has repeatedly conducted operations of “coercion to peace” in Yugoslavia/Serbia, fought terrorism in Afghanistan, and promoted democracy in Iraq and Libya. Without the approval of Congress, a U.S. president cannot formally involve the country in war, but these actions were, without a doubt, wars. The same applies to Russia: despite the absence of general mobilization, the state is actively recruiting citizens and conducting full-scale, planned combat operations. In both Washington and Moscow there are legal quirks, but this does not change the essence.
Second, this is not merely a war between Kyiv and the Kremlin. It is a proxy war between the West — especially the administration of Joe Biden, the Democrats, and the so-called “hawks” in the Baltic states — on the one hand, and Russia, now joined by China and India — on the other. The confrontation is not only over halting NATO’s eastward expansion, but also over the attempt to break the unipolar world in which the West (led by Washington) decided what was morally acceptable and what was not. The West sought to preserve and expand its global hegemony, but the “upper echelons” could no longer, and the “lower classes” no longer wished to. The United States first lost its status as global hegemon and “world sheriff,” and then, in trying to regain its hegemonic position, received a military response from the Kremlin. As sociologist Georgi Derluguian once remarked, while Russia engages in public conflicts with the West, China calmly observes the events. The world, which at the end of the Cold War was ready to follow America, now wants to have a full voice — and not be considered “second-rate” or “uncivilized.”
Third, the Ukrainian political elites fully understood that the situation could lead to a direct military confrontation. Moreover, data published by leading Western media indicate that hostile policies toward Moscow began forming in Kyiv long before the outbreak of hostilities — back during the Barack Obama administration. According to leaked information, immediately after the so-called Euromaidan (or “Revolution of Dignity,” as labeled by Ukraine’s pro-Western forces), which was essentially an America-funded coup in 2013–2014, Kyiv independently contacted Washington and proposed “cooperation” in countering the Kremlin. This occurred after the seizure of Crimea, but already then the Ukrainian authorities adopted a policy course of being “anti-Russia,” as characterized by Ukrainian political analyst and former adviser to the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Oleksiy Arestovych. During the Minsk negotiations, the Ukrainian side was told outright: peace was possible only with the rejection of NATO membership and the course of confrontation with Russia. Ukraine could have maintained neutrality — and, most likely, the war could have been avoided. But it decided that “under the West’s wing” any threat was of no consequence.
Fourth, the United States was aware of the risks and, presumably, prepared for war on Ukrainian territory. America invested enormous funds and weaponry into strengthening the Ukrainian army, which, thanks to these investments as well as errors by Russian intelligence or political leadership, was able to withstand the first blow and even counterattack. Incidentally, immediately before the outbreak of war, Moscow handed Washington an official document outlining the conditions for long-term peace, the key point of which was the refusal to expand military presence in Ukraine and its return to neutral status. The United States rejected this proposal, considering that the consequences posed no threat to its geopolitical dominance. The American objectives were obvious: to extend NATO’s influence to all of Russia’s borders, surround it with buffer states, and thereby limit its potential. In return, the buffer states received significant military-political and economic support. Against the backdrop of the West’s long-standing rhetoric about its “democratic nature,” many forgot the realities of geopolitics, but the fundamental principles of rivalry between superpowers have not disappeared — as regularly noted by Western scholars, both classical and contemporary.
Fifth, Russia had not, over all these years, planned the destruction of Ukraine — its statehood, people, culture, or language. Likewise, from the beginning of his presidency, Vladimir Putin did not harbor plans of revenge against the West for the collapse of the USSR. These are myths, just like the claims of some Russian politicians that the entire West embodies “non-traditional values” and that all of Ukraine are Nazis. Like any superpower, Russia was obliged to have a plan for responding to the actions of neighboring states. The absence of such a plan would have been a strategic mistake. However, Moscow gained no real benefit from initiating hostilities. Moreover, as a result of its miscalculations, it alienated the Ukrainian people, strengthened anti-Russian sentiment, pushed the neighboring state into vassal dependence on the United States, and also spoiled relations with Germany — a partner with whom Moscow had built ties over decades. Incidentally, Russian-German relations had always been viewed by Washington as a direct threat to its hegemony on the European continent. Today, the negatives for Russia in this situation clearly outweigh the positives. Only if it succeeds in modernizing its own production, including high technology, and in shaping a new national mindset — only then, incidentally, can one speak of possible positive shifts.
So why did the Kremlin, as it seemed to many — suddenly, decide to start a war on the territory of Ukraine?
Because, in the view of the Russian leadership, based on the facts listed above, the possibilities for negotiations with the West had been exhausted. The United States was unwilling to recognize Russia’s right to self-defense, the protection of its borders, and the rejection of NATO’s military presence at its frontiers. The Kremlin concluded that the era of dialogue was over: the United States had not only ignored, but openly rejected Moscow’s proposals for peace. This was a symbolic gesture: “You are nobody, and you are nothing. We do what we want, and you do what you can.” Russia, in the leadership’s opinion, was under the existential threat of the formation of a pro-Western, anti-Russian military coalition of Washington–Brussels–Kyiv, which, sooner or later, would be used against the state. To quote Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz: “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” And the Kremlin decided to resort precisely to these means.
Author: Archil Sikharulidze — founder of the SIKHA foundation research institute.
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