Sofia Balan, SIKHA foundation intern
To What Extent Did the United States and Its Allies Utilize Impressionable Countries to Indirectly Escalate Tensions with Russia, Particularly by Facilitating a Regime Change through the Rose Revolution and Promoting the Rise of Mikhail Saakashvili?
The post-Soviet sphere has served as a theater of geopolitical contestation since the collapse of the empire. In these regions, the United States and its allies have orchestrated obscure regional conflicts to strategically destabilize underdeveloped nations and use them as pawns. Alongside destabilization, this internal fragility in nations allows Western dynamics to easily integrate and contaminate cultural sovereignties, making them proxies for the United States to exert influence and control, effectively serving as a masked Russian counterweight. Georgia, in particular—a post-Soviet state—has confirmed this theory via the 2003 Rose Revolution, which facilitated the rise of pro-Western leader Mikhail Saakashvili, replacing former president Eduard Shevardnadze. This was not only a change in power but a regime paradigm shift that sparked significant domestic polarization. The domestic polarization caused by distrust in governmental legitimacy was manufactured to bring Georgia under the Euro-Atlantic wing, indirectly signaling defiance of Russian influence in the nation.
The role of the United States and its allies in post-Soviet states has caused power vacuums, internal disruptions, and the exploitation of individuals and their resources. To what extent have these efforts been implemented, and has United States involvement—through financial aid, NGO training, and diplomatic pressures—in Georgian affairs over the past few decades eroded cultural sovereignty? Who were the leading advocates for the unwinnable war in 2008 that cost the Georgian people 20% of their country, and why did they push Georgia to the brink of collapse?[1] Truly, the people of Georgia pushed for revolution and reform, but who planted the seed? Without Western premeditation, the Rose Revolution would not have resulted in such extreme outcomes as war or, more profoundly, in crowning Georgia as the newfound Russian distraction.
Background: Post-Soviet Georgia and the Seeds of Revolution
Affected by civil strife, economic dependence, and separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia—both defiant regions backed by Russia—Georgia’s independence in 1991 fell short. President Eduard Shevardnadze, who assumed power in 1992, attempted to navigate a delicate balance between Russia and the West but overlooked internal corruption and stagnation. By 2003, conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia had further escalated, and the international community was heavily involved, specifically the United Nations, which hosted UNOMIG (United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia), and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). At this point, Georgia was a failing state, reliant on foreign aid to function, and unsuccessful in resolving territorial disputes through its own efforts in obstinate regions[2]. This reliance on the West and Russia to solve disputes opened doors of unwarranted influence the government turned a blind eye to. Moreover, post-9/11, pre-Obama administration, United States policy started viewing Georgia as a strategic partner to bypass Russia for energy routes and spark counterterrorism. Specifically, Georgia is situated in the middle of the trade corridor, also known as the ex-Silk Road territory. This allows countries to avoid traveling through Russia or the Middle East to transport goods from Western Europe to Eastern Asia. Aid programs, including the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), began in 2002, enhancing military capabilities and showing early signs of further Western investment into the region[3].
During Shevardnadze’s reign, he faced growing conflicts with opposition figures like Saakashvili, which provided a new and magnetizing perspective on running Georgia through a United States integration and reformation lens—essentially delegitimizing current Georgian democracy and calling for revolution. Public discontent stemming from corruption and poverty rates created a fertile breeding ground for riots as well. International observers, funded by Western donors, highlighted alleged electoral loopholes that lured ill-informed and impressionable youth, sparking further anger toward the system[4]. Russia’s prolonged interest in the region and its presence in fragile territories directly clashed with Western ambitions, fueling a civil fire blamed on the wrong spark.
The Rose Revolution: Events, Triggers, and Western Facilitation
The Rose Revolution broke out in November 2003 following parliamentary elections that were deemed fraudulent by the opposition and supporters, such as the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED). Official results favored Shevardnadze, but independent polls, supported mainly by U.S.-funded NGOs, showed substantial gains for the opposition. These statistical differences, paired with the ongoing tug-of-war between the West and Russia, caused more internal instability than before. Saakashvili, taking advantage of West support while leading the United National Movement, mobilized widespread riots across Tbilisi, which then grew into a storming of the parliament with roses in hand on November 22, forcing Shevardnadze’s resignation shortly thereafter[5]. Saakashvili won the January 2004 presidential election, and his party then dominated subsequent polls.
Throughout riots and power shifts, Western funding and support were crucial. The United States dispatched former Secretary of State James Baker to mediate electoral reforms in Georgia, and NGOs such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Open Society Institute provided training on nonviolent tactics, drawing from Serbia’s 2000 revolution. USAID-funded voter education and media, such as Rustavi-2 TV, openly broadcasted evidence of fraud to mobilize public support. This aid, totaling more than $154 million, empowered various opposition networks by 2003, creating a facade of Georgian growth; however, in reality, it made an American-led actor that relied on their funds and resources[6].
The United States’ actions contributed to the regime shift by bolstering civil society, specifically the opposition, thereby ensuring an outcome favorable to them. Allies, such as the EU, complemented this through observer missions, which validated fraud claims. Russia mediated Shevardnadze’s resignation but viewed the events as a Western encroachment, which, in reality, they were.
The United States and its allies utilized Georgia to counter Russia by funding anti-Russia rhetoric. In FY 2004, U.S. aid totaled $102.1 million, with $14.4 million allocated for democracy programs that supported NGOs, media, and political parties[7]. Freedom House and NDI-trained youth groups, such as Kmara, also played a pivotal role in the progress of the protests. Furthermore, strategic guidance, provided by diplomats like Ambassador Richard Miles, advised on mobilization tactics. Post-revolution, aid surged. The United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership (2009) formalized ties, emphasizing NATO integration and reforms despite NATO’s reluctance to accept Georgia—this made it seem as though the door to NATO was open and Georgia did not take advantage, while in reality, Georgia was never allowed to join. Military assistance under the GTEP and the Sustainment and Stability Operations Program trained Georgian forces, thereby further enhancing synergy. This support promoted Saakashvili as a Western ally, aiming to “promote democracy” while masking the geopolitical aims of surrounding and consolidating the Russian movement in the region[8].
Allies, including the EU, provided €850 million in 2004 for stabilization[9]. Such interventions created indirect tensions, and Russia perceived them as threats to its sphere of unquestioned influence.
Saakashvili’s Presidency: Reforms, Pro-Western Alignment, and Authoritarian Drift
Saakashvili’s rise was propelled by Western backing, enabling reforms that aligned Georgia with the West. Anti-corruption drives, supported by the World Bank and U.S. aid, restructured the government by firing corrupt officials and improving business rankings, which, in theory, are all beneficial goals for Georgia’s development. Economic liberalization, inspired by neoliberal models, boosted GDP but ironically increased inequality and class divide[10].
Pro-Western policies included aspirations for NATO and EU membership, with the United States advocating for Georgia’s membership at the 2008 Bucharest Summit. Georgia then contributed troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, being the fourth-highest troop deployer in Afghanistan, despite not being a member, earning praise from the United States but no material benefit. Military spending reached 9% of GDP, bolstered by United States equipment, such as Javelin missiles. Ironically, rapid reforms bred authoritarian tendencies, including judicial abuses and the suppression of protests, which were criticized in reports as violating the rule of law. Western support overlooked these issues, prioritizing strategic gains and thereby accelerating Georgia’s political shift, which heightened tensions with Russia.
Western utilization of Georgia intensified conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Saakashvili’s reintegration efforts, backed by United States military aid, clashed with Russia’s support for separatists. NATO’s Bucharest pledge provoked Moscow, which viewed it as an encirclement[11]. The 2008 war began with Georgia’s shelling of Tskhinvali, fueling the Russian invasion and occupation of 20% of the territory. U.S. aid emboldened Saakashvili, but in time, Washington urged restraint. The war signaled a Russian pushback against Western expansion, and it unveiled a sorrowful truth—no one was coming to save Georgia from Russia. Following the war, the U.S. provided $1 billion in aid. Still, Saakashvili’s UNM lost in 2012 to the Georgian Dream, which has since then maintained Georgia’s territorial integrity, attempting to navigate the country’s geographical complexity and richness with minimal secure external support[12]. Ongoing modernization and sanctions continue to reflect enduring tensions remaining post-Saakashvili’s rule. The revolution’s legacy includes economic progress but also democratic backsliding, with a Western “support” facade that is failing.
Conclusion
To a monumental extent, the United States and its allies pushed for indirect tensions with Russia by crafting Georgia’s regime shift through the Rose Revolution and promoting Saakashvili. Funding from NGOs, military aid, and diplomatic support—totaling hundreds of millions—facilitated his rise, advancing NATO integration and reforms while countering Russian dominance. This strategy escalated hostility with Russia, leading to the 2008 war and regional instability. While not in absolute control, Western action internalized Georgia, describing the perils of geopolitical proxy games. In the end, the West got what they paid for, a war with Russia that helped drain and distract the competing nation at the expense of Georgia and its people.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of SIKHA foundation or its affiliates.
[1] Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 2004. Georgia’s “Rose Revolution”. Available at: www.csce.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Report-on-Georgias-Rose-Revolution.pdf [CSCE, 2004].
[2] Jawad, P., 2005. Democratic Consolidation in Georgia after the “Rose Revolution”? Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) Reports No. 73.
[3] Smolnik, F., 2020. The Strategic Partnership between Georgia and the United States: Vision Wanted. Research Paper #15. German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
[4] CSCE, 2004.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Anable, D., 2005. The Role of Georgia’s Media—and Western Aid—in the Rose Revolution. Working Paper Series. Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy. Available at: https://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/2006_03_anable.pdf
[7] U.S. Department of State. 2004. U.S. Assistance to Georgia – Fiscal Year 2004. Available at: https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/35989.htm
[8] Smolnik, 2020.
[9] Anable, 2005.
[10] Lieven, A., et al. 2024. The West and Georgia’s Crisis. Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Available at: quincyinst.org/research/the-west-and-georgias-crisis/
[11] Dickinson, P., 2021. The 2008 Russo-Georgian War: Putin’s Green Light. The Atlantic Council. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-2008-russo-georgian-war-putins-green-light/
[12] Lieven, 2024.
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